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Abstract. The tenth outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in North Kivu, theDemocratic Republic of theCongo (DRC),
was declared 8 days after the end of the ninth EVD outbreak, in the Equateur Province on August 1, 2018. With a total of
3,461 confirmed and probable cases, the North Kivu outbreakwas the second largest outbreak after that inWest Africa in
2014–2016, and the largest observed in the DRC. This outbreak was difficult to control because of multiple challenges,
including armed conflict, population displacement, movement of contacts, community mistrust, and high population
density. It took more than 21 months to control the outbreak, with critical innovations and systems put into place. We
describe systems that were put into place during the EVD response in the DRC that can be leveraged for the response to
the current COVID-19 global pandemic.
INTRODUCTION
On August 1, 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC)declared its tenthoutbreakofEbolavirusdisease (EVD) in
North Kivu. This outbreak was declared 8 days after the end of
the ninth EVD outbreak in the Equateur Province, with a total of
54 confirmed and probable cases.1 With a total of 3,453 con-
firmedandprobablecases, theNorthKivuoutbreak remains the
second largest EVD outbreak, after theWest Africa outbreak in
2014–2016.2 Several security incidents, including attacks by
armedgroups, hindered implementationofactivitiesbycausing
a reduced operational presence, rendered certain health zones
inaccessible, and likely led to increased transmission.3,4 Since
January 2019,more than 350 incidents that disrupted response
activitieswere recorded, 80%ofwhichwere directly targeted at
structures or response personnel.4 Population displacement,
conflict, a highly densepopulation,mistrust, and insufficient aid
for basic services impacted response activities.
TheEVD responsewasgovernment ledwith the support of a
number of technical and strategic partners such as the WHO,
UNICEF, the World Food Program, the International Organi-
zation of Migration (IOM), the U.S. CDC, the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and a number of non-
governmental organizations. Donorsworked in concerted and
harmonized ways to support the response. The response was
driven by a unique National Ebola Strategic Response Plan
with a unique budget. The public health response was co-
ordinated by the Multi-sectoral Technical Secretariat and the
Ministry of Health. Core pillars of the response were coled by
the government and technical partners such as the WHO,
UNICEF, the IOM, and the International Federation of the Red
Cross (see Table 1).
Themain strategicobjectiveof theEVD responsewas tobreak
chains of transmission, by ensuring rapid detection and isolation
of cases, intensification of multidisciplinary public health mea-
sures around a confirmed case, strengthening of community
engagement activities, strengthening of health systems, and ef-
fective coordination of both local and international partners.
On December 31, 2019, the WHO China Country Office was
informed of cases of pneumonia of unknown etiology detected in
Wuhan city, Hubei Province. By January 7, 2020, Chinese sci-
entists isolated a novel coronavirus.5 The COVID-19 outbreak
was declared a public health emergency of international concern
on January 30, 2020. On March 11, the WHO declared a global
pandemicofCOVID-19asa result of thespreadofSARS-CoV-2.6
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DRC 10th EVD OUTBREAK
Although modes of transmission and strategies to “flatten
the curve” differ between EVD and COVID-19, there are broad
lessons learned from the EVD response that can generally be
applied to the COVID-19 response. An effective COVID-19
response focuses on rapid detection via testing, contact
tracing, isolation, treatment, and mitigation measures in-
cluding physical distancing. We describe critical systems that
were put into place during the tenth EVD response in the DRC
that we believe can be leveraged for the response to the cur-
rent COVID-19 pandemic (Table 2).
Coordination. Coordination of international and national
counterparts during a public health emergency is critical, with
an accountability system and clear understanding of who is in
charge. Coordination for the EVD response was under the
leadership of the MOH and Technical Secretariat, a multi-
sectoral body put into place by the presidency. Clear roles for
the coleads (United Nations and other international organiza-
tions) were established. Command and control of operations
was centralized in Goma, with decentralized sub-coordination
at the health zone level.
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The lack of standardized data on the implementation of
operations during the West African EVD outbreak led to the
creation of amonitoring framework. This provided operational
and strategic analyses to enable partners and donors to
follow-up on response outcomes. The monitoring framework
in the DRC represented one of the first attempts to use a
harmonized, multisectorial, and real-time monitoring system
that maintained situational awareness to evaluate short- and
medium-term impacts of activities.7
TheTechnical Secretariat adoptedan incidentmanagement
system, whose aim was to improve information flow and de-
centralize decision-making. It created clear roles and re-
sponsibilities to ensure improved span of control and chain of
command, which was necessary because of the lack of
prompt decision-making at the coordination level.
ForCOVID-19, national governments should consider using
an incident management system to support coordination of
the response at the national level. This will allow for decen-
tralized and prompt decision-making on operations and pro-
vision of technical guidance. Under the leadership of the
government, strategic meetings should be held regularly, with
lead agencies involved in the operationalization and techni-
cal leadership of the response. Countries should consider
adopting a monitoring framework that looks at performance
indicators to guide the implementation of multi-sectorial oper-
ations in real time.
Surveillance. Public health performance indicators at the
beginning of the EVD response were poor, with increasing
community deaths, poor contact tracing (indicated by the high
number of cases that had no known contacts), and delays
between symptom onset and isolation. A decline in cases
toward the endof 2019was thought to be due to improvement
in the quality of surveillance activities, including prompt in-
vestigation, early detection and isolation of cases, an adaptive
vaccination strategy (from ring strategy to geographic vacci-
nation), community-based surveillance, and the prioritization
of follow-up with high-risk contacts. Food distribution was
provided to contacts to restrict their movement, a practice
begun in West Africa by the World Food Program.
Having a platform of rapid response teams, the use of in-
novations suchasGo.Data, a software developedby theWHO
and Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network partners,
enhanced the monitoring of contact tracing data in the DRC,
including the visualization of chains of transmission and
contact follow-up. Community health workers were trained to
conduct contact tracing, with a strong supervisory system, to
ensure quality interventions.
As with EVD, it is critical that for the COVID-19 response,
community structures and leaders be involved at an early stage
in surveillance activities. Case isolation and aggressive testing,
and involvement of trusted community leaders in the promotion
of these interventions, can help coordinate and improve the ef-
fectiveness of control measures. Rapid training should be con-
ducted for surveillance teams to be able to investigate alerts,
investigate cases and clusters early in the outbreak, conduct
contact tracing within 24 hours, collect and analyze epidemio-
logic information, and adjust messaging appropriately.
Community-based surveillance and alert systems linked to
a prompt investigation system can help to address contact
tracing challenges for COVID-19 in many countries. It is im-
portant that community structures be involved at an early
stage in surveillance activities, and community leaders should
be involved in ensuring proper contact tracing.
Similar software systems as for EVD should be considered
for contact tracing for COVID-19. In addition, the use of
community volunteers can help create a robust workforce for
contact-tracing activities. Those with field epidemiology or
community health outreach should be identified early and can
be leveraged for contact-tracing activities.
Other innovations, such as a dedicated unit/structure
established for the follow-up of lost contacts and never seen
contacts (aswasdone for EVD), canbeput intoplace toensure
improved contact tracing. COVID-19 strategies at the national
level often require quarantine and isolation, which is difficult to
do in low- and middle-income countries. The distribution of
food to those that are experiencing food insecurity becomes
critical. It may help to restrict movement of contacts and en-
force compliance to confinement measures.
Analysis cell. Dedicated to analyzing response-related
data, the social sciences and epidemiological analysis cell
was established to provide critical and timely assessment of
the epidemiological situation and to inform EVD response
activities. The systematic use of both statistical epidemiology
and social sciences data provided a comprehensive un-
derstanding of context, with epidemiological analysis identi-
fying new patterns in the data and social sciences providing
explanations on underlying causes. In 2019, the imple-
mentation of novel outbreak analytics approaches permitted
further developments of both routinemonitoring activities and
operational research, thereby increasing capacity for in-depth
analyses. This allowed for enhanced situational awareness
over the course of the epidemic, leading to identification of
aspects of the response needing strengthening, and generally
improving surveillance. The social science cell also set up an
TABLE 1
Public health response pillars (technical areas)
Sub-pillar Lead Colead
1. Risk communication and community engagement Ministry of Health UNICEF
2. Surveillance, contact tracing, and vaccination Ministry of Health WHO
3. Laboratory and research Ministry of Health WHO
4. Case management, free care, and survivor care Ministry of Health WHO
5. Infection, prevention, and control/water, sanitation, and
hygiene
Ministry of Health WHO/UNICEF
6. Safe and dignified burials Ministry of Health International Federation of the Red Cross
7. Psychosocial support Ministry of Health UNICEF
8. Operational preparedness Ministry of Health WHO
9. Coordination Ministry of Health
10. Support to coordination Ministry of Health World Bank, WHO, and UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
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TABLE 2
Key interventions to consider for the COVID-19 response
Technical area 10th Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola virus disease response Relevance for COVID-19 response
Response coordination Incident management system to improve
information flow and decentralize decision-
making
Use of an incident management system to support
coordination of COVID-19 response
Under government leadership, ensure routine
strategic meetings
Creation of functional groups with clear roles and
responsibilities to ensure improved span of
control and chain of command
Need for a multi-sectorial response
Decentralized operational coordination at the
subdistrict level
Development of key performance indicators to
ensure corrective action for critical response
interventionsMonitoring framework comprehensive: inputs,
outputs, outcomes, and impacts
Key performance indicator developed to ensure
corrective action
Surveillance Monitoring unit established to improve follow-up of
lost contacts
Establishmonitoringuni/structure to improve follow-
up of contacts lost to follow-up
Involve community structures at early stage of
surveillance activities to generate alerts
Food distribution provided to contacts Consider food distributions to communities under
isolation/quarantineCommunity leaders involved in ensuring proper
contact tracin Identify individuals with field epidemiology expertise
to conduct surveillance activities (including
contact tracing)
Conduct rapid training of surveillance team
members to investigate alerts, and collect and
analyze epidemiologic information
Active case finding and door-to-door activities
implemented to improve case detection coupled
with community watch interventions to ensure
tracking of movements (new arrivals, deaths, and
illnesses)
Investigate alerts reported by households,
community leaders, or health facilities and report
validated alerts within 24 hoursActive case search in health facilities
Functional triage systems in health facilities
An alert monitoring and investigation platform that
helped investigate cases within 24 hours
Risk communication and
community engagement
Community-centered approach with feedback
mechanisms to follow and address rumors
Early involvement of anthropologists and social
scientists in the development of risk
communication and community engagement
approaches
Anthropologists and social scientist engaged to
provide feedback on different responsemeasures
Creation of feedback mechanisms to better target
activities
Trust gained from local religious, traditional, and
community leaders to mitigate community
reticence Prepare communities to play active role with other
response interventionsCommunity structures and community health
workers who speak local language used to better
communicate with communities
Early identificationandengagementwith community
leaders to mitigate community reticence to
response interventionsAnthropologists and/or social scientists included in
part of the response
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
Established standardized package for IPC Define and implement a standardized IPC package
Capitalize on IPC tool kit and standard package for
training of trainers
Implemented ring IPC with supervision (IPC focal
point at health facilities) and frequent evaluations
(use of IPC score card) Target traditional healers and pharmacists
Used evidence to adapt and improve strategy
Casemanagement and free
care
Decentralized transit centers used to rapidly test and
isolate cases in setting close to communities,
which also improved willingness to seek care
Consider a similar model of decentralized care and
testing
Disseminate standardized guidelines on optimized
care based on existing/evolving evidence
Ensure that free-care models can cope with
increased use of health services
Create SOPs and guidelines for optimized care
based on existing evidence
Consider compassionate use for investigational
drugsandconduct studies to lookat effectiveness
Operational preparedness Defined a package of activities for operational
preparedness to reduce the risk of spreading
Ebola virus disease to at-risk areas
Anticipate mechanism to increase capacity for
control measures (early detection, investigation,
laboratory confirmation, isolation, and treatment
Deployed experts to at-risk health zone to
implement readiness activities and strengthen the
health system
Work on mass training mechanism and
prepositioning of treatment items (critical care,
ventilators. . .)
Conduct training to equip health zones based on
clear protocols and package of activities
Use similar preparedness package of interventions
for COVID-19
Trained rapid response teams to investigate alerts in
non-affected health zones
(continued)
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online recommendation tracking tool, to monitor actions by
study, by response measure and by location over time. Using
this tracking mechanism enabled response teams to evaluate
effectiveness of response interventions and monitor impact
using evidence.
For COVID-19, to have real-time data that inform the re-
sponse, governments should consider establishing an ana-
lytical cell, embedded within the response structure, which
would enable improved understanding of the epidemiological
situation as well as community perception and practice,
allowing for evidence-based targeted programming that
continuously informs the national strategy.
Riskcommunicationandcommunity engagement. In the
DRC, existing local community structureswere not included at
the beginning of the EVD response. Rather, the inclusion of
these structures from the outset should be the cornerstone of
all community engagement activities.
The inclusion of traditional, religious, and political leaders
was delayed in the DRC, and the use of appropriate language
was not included early. Engagement with trusted community,
political, and religious leaders offers an essential gateway to
the community. Early identification and engagement of com-
munity leaders is essential to achieve acceptance and com-
pliance with public health measures, as these leaders are
critical points of access to their communities.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo has five national
languages and more than 300 local languages. Therefore,
utilization of the appropriate local language by community
mobilizers, who were recruited from their own communities,
was critical. For example, Kinande and Kiswahili are spoken
by the Nande population that was predominantly affected by
the EVD outbreak. Instead, many organizations used French
and Lingala (a lingua franca used by the military), which are
national languages, making it challenging for the Nande and
other communities to comprehend health messaging.
In the DRC, a community-centered approach was adopted,
with feedbackmechanisms to follow and address rumors and
to informother responsepillars (such as surveillance, infection
prevention and control (IPC), and safe and dignified burials).
Very early on, risk communication anthropologists were en-
gaged to support different pillars on addressing andmitigating
community tensions and reticence, as well as to work with
feedback mechanisms, ensuring proper communication.
For COVID-19, the early involvement of trusted leaders is crit-
ical in ensuring that communities adhere to public health mea-
sures, such as physical distancing practices. For COVID-19, the
use of local languages for all risk communication and community
engagement activities is key. In addition, COVID-19 national re-
sponses should include early involvement of anthropologists and
social scientists to target behavioral change around mitigation
measures such as social distancing. This should be coupledwith
thecreationof feedbackmechanisms fromcommunities tobetter
target activities, and community-based surveillance and sensiti-
zation forpreventivemeasures.Theability to incorporateagreater
understanding of the perceptions and practice of communities
and healthcare workers is likely to result in the development of
more targeted programming.
Infection prevention and control. Nosocomial trans-
mission played an important role in the spread of EVD, with 5%
of infections occurring among healthcare workers and high in-
cidence of nosocomial infections within private and traditional
health centers. A standardized package for IPC/water, sanita-
tion, and hygiene was established to ensure a coordinated IPC
strategy. Supervision (establishing an IPC focal point at health
facilities) and frequent evaluations (use of an IPC score card)
were put into place. Evaluations helped in developing plans to
fill gapsandmonitor responseprogress. Traditional healers and
pharmacists were involved in IPC training, albeit late, as they
played an important role in the spread of Ebola. Triage systems
set up in health facilities helped to ensure health service con-
tinuity, allowing access to health services for regular health
care. Applying IPC measures allowed mass malaria drug ad-
ministration and a measles vaccination campaign.
For COVID-19, given the high number of healthcare pro-
viders that are becoming infected, an evaluation of the IPC
systems at health facilities that informs planning remains
critical. Monitoring of programming should be put in place as
soon as possible, involving all the stakeholders.
TABLE 2
Continued
Technical area 10th Democratic Republic of the Congo Ebola virus disease response Relevance for COVID-19 response
Analytics cell Set up epidemiological and social sciences analysis
structure to provide real-time integrated analysis
Develop integrated analysis structure to provide
real-time insights and design appropriate
response
Monitor epidemiolocal trends beyond that of the
outbreak (concurrent diseases) to mitigated
impacts of outbreak and response
Monitor perceptions and reported use of health
services
Regularly monitoring and understanding of health
behavior trends (perceptions and reported
use—mixed analysis)
Used evidence to inform different response
measures
Set up mechanisms to monitor and track
recommendations
Donor coordination Preparationof a unique strategic responseplan,with
validated unit costs for all response interventions
Ensure global donor coordination
Ensure alignment with national strategies
Establish processes, including eligibility criteria for
hazard payments, pay scales, and payment
modalities, as well as mechanisms to
systematically list healthcare workers
Involvement in the planning process and continuous
interaction to share challenges and gaps to be
filled
Ensuring resources as well as technical support
were provided just in time based on priority areas
and gap filling.
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Case management and free care. In the EVD response,
protocols for optimized care were established and dissemi-
nated. The monitored emergency use of unregistered and in-
vestigational interventions for EVD trial was put into place
early, allowing for the use of therapeutics under compas-
sionate care for confirmed EVD patients. Despite the chal-
lenging security environment, a randomized controlled trial
testing the efficacy of investigational drugs was quickly put
into place.8 Decentralized transit centers with the ability to
rapidly conduct testing and isolation close to communities
were critical in improving access to care.
COVID-19 has many similarities to EVD in that there is not a
known cure. There is a need for the creation of treatment pro-
tocols describing optimized care that will be rapidly updated
with evolving evidence. The use of investigational drugs under
compassionate care should be done on a case-by-case basis
for COVID-19, with clear guidelines for their use, and collection
of data on their effectiveness. Countries should be advised to
facilitate rapid ethical clearance processes for clinical trials
examining the effectiveness of investigational therapies.
To prevent increased morbidity and mortality from other
diseases,mechanisms should be in place to ensure continuity
of standard health care, including a triage mechanism and a
system for staff repurposing and maintenance of supply
chains for essential medicines.
Operational preparedness. In the EVD response, a pack-
age of activities was defined for operational preparedness to
reduce the risk of spread to at-risk health zones. Experts were
deployed to implement readiness activities. Rapid response
teamswere trained to investigate alerts in non-affected health
zones, providers were trained in standard IPC measures,
mentorshipwas organized in health centers, and isolation rooms
were identified and equipped in health facilities. Preparedness
measures allowed for a prompt response in new provinces and
cities, even in the neighboring country of Uganda.
For COVID-19, preparedness based on a readiness assess-
ment should lead to activities to ensure rapid detection of cases
and a comprehensive response. This should include developing
preparedness and response plans, training of response teams,
prepositioning of supplies, and preparing treatment centers.
Preparedness activities should be decentralized as quickly as
possible to be ahead of the spread of the disease.
Multi-sectoral approach. Challenges such as limited ac-
cess to potable water, food insecurity, and armed conflict all
contributed to the difficulty in containing the EVD outbreak.
There was a need to ensure the continuity of services, to
mitigate potential secondary impacts of the outbreak, and to
deliver response interventions. There was also an important
need to consider community needs in addition to the EVD
outbreak. Responding to what communities perceive as their
priorities is key for community engagement and acceptance.
For COVID-19, there is a need for a multi-sectorial approach,
enabling interventions to increase compliance to public health
measures and avoid secondary problems such as disease
outbreaks, food insecurity, and economic hardship.
Donor coordination, accountability, and transparency.
The tenth EVD outbreak resulted in mobilizing important
funding to support strategic plans. Aligning and harmonizing
engagement with the national government was instrumental
for donors to ensure that resources and technical support
were provided based on priority areas and gap filling. To ensure
greater accountability and transparency, afiduciary systemwas
put in place. The main objective was to provide government,
implementing partners, and donors relevant information re-
quired to ensure adequate and timely flow of funds and make
informed strategic, technical, and operational decisions.
For COVID-19, financing of a response should include the
preparation of a unique strategic response plan, with validated
unitcosts forall response interventions.Basedon lessons learned
from EVD, it is critical to establish processes, including eligibility
criteria for hazard payments, pay scales, mechanisms to sys-
tematically list healthcare workers, and payment modalities.
CONCLUSION
Key lessons learned from the 10th DRC EVD outbreak re-
sponse ought to be implemented as key interventions in the
development of national COVID-19 response strategies. Al-
though not all of these are relevant because of differentmodes
of transmission, we have highlighted those that remain rele-
vant for the COVID-19 response. Most important are a strong
decentralized coordination system, a sensitive surveillance
system rooted in communities, risk communication, and
community engagement. Technical innovations including
IPC, decentralized treatment facilities, and strengthening of
health services to avoid secondary crises are also critical.
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Lokonga, Programme de Développement du Système de Santé,
Ministry of Health, E-mail: lokongaj@gmail.com. Luigi Minikulu,
Mathias Mossoko, and Steve Ahuka-Mundeke, Ebola Technical
Secretariat, E-mails: lminikulu1@gmail.com, mossokomathias@
gmail.com, and amsteve04@yahoo.fr. Emanuele Bruni and Ibrahima
Soce Fall, World Health Emergencies Programme, E-mails: bruni@
who.int and socef@who.int. Thibaut Jombart, London School of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, London, United Kingdom, E-mail:
thibautjombart@gmail.com.
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) License, which permits un-
restricted use, distribution, and reproduction in anymedium, provided
the original author and source are credited.
REFERENCES
1. World Health Organization, 2018. Situation Report: Declaration of




2. World Health Organization, 2020. Situation Report Ebola Virus Dis-
ease Democratic Republic of Congo: External Situation Report
16 MOBULA AND OTHERS
86/2019. Available at: https://www.who.int/publications-detail/
ebola-virus-disease-democratic-republic-of-congo-external-
situation-report-86-2019. Accessed April 2, 2020.
3. Ilunga Kalenga O, Moeti M, Sparrow A, Nguyen VK, Lucey D,
Ghebreyesus TA, 2019. The ongoing ebola epidemic in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, 2018–2019.N Engl J Med 381:
373–383.
4. Wells CR, Pandey A, Martial L, Mbah N, Gaüzère BA, Malvy D,
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